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Abstract—We present a new quasigroup based block encryp-
tion system with and without cipher-block-chaining. We compare
its performance against Advanced Encryption Standard-256
(AES256) bit algorithm using the NIST statistical test suite
(NIST-STS) that tests for randomness of a sequence. Since it
is well known that a good encryption algorithm must destroy
any statistical properties of the input sequence and produce an
output close to a true random sequence, the NIST-STS suite
results provide a good test bench. In almost all tests from the
suite the proposed algorithm performs better than AES256.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensor networks provide a challenging area of research,
because of constraints such as low computational power, low
memory capacity and limited communication ranges. As their
popularity for various applications such as border surveillance,
patient health monitoring, surveillance and environment data
collection increases, the demand for security and privacy also
increases. Moreover, now a days smart-phones have several
sensors within them that may be used to monitor health
conditions and used for emergency purposes. In this case,
security, integrity and privacy of data that is being transmitted
are of utmost importance.
The most popular method for encryption in sensor networks
is the use of secret key encryption systems such as Triple
DES or AES [14], [13]. This is because secret key algorithms
have much lower computational requirements compared with
public-key systems, which is crucial especially in resource
constrained environments such as sensor networks. In this
paper we develop a new secret key encryption scheme, that is
ideally suited for encryption in low computational and memory
constrained environments. We run statistical tests on both the
input and output streams, testing them for randomness using
the NIST-STS package. The test results are compared with the
popularly used Advanced Encryption Standard 256 (AES-256)
bit encryption. The results show equal or better performance
under all tests and that the encryption method is very good in
destroying the structure of the input sequence.
Quasigroups are similar to Sudoku and Latin squares. They
have been previously investigated for their application to en-
cryption. Gligoroski et. al. [6], [8], [7] looked at stream cipher
and public key implementations of quasigroups. A multi-level
quasigroup implementation was proposed by Satti and Kak
[16] where they used different sizes of quasigroups to encrypt
data. They combined it with indices and nonces to improve
on the strength of the encryption. However, their system also
focuses on a stream cipher implementation. Marnas et. al.
[11] implement a quasigroup all-or-nothing system. However,
they only use quasigroup encryption to replace the XOR
operation used within other all-or-nothing system, hence in the
end the actual encryption is done using other cryptosystems.
Quasigroups have also been applied to error correction [9] and
in construction of message authentication codes (MAC) [1].
One may view quasigroup transformation as a substitution
and permutation operation. These transforms form the basis
of numerous encryption systems specially in speech encryp-
tion [12], [3]. Further, public key systems such as NTRU
[10] and elliptic curve cryptosystems [2] have lower power
consumptions compared to RSA however compared to secret
key systems they are much more computationally expensive.
Moreover, the algorithms proposed in this paper do not require
any computations to be performed but only table look up
operations for encryption and decryption.
To our knowledge, this is the first quasigroup block encryp-
tion algorithm similar in strength to AES with advantages in
both computational and memory requirements over the latter.
II. BACKGROUND ON QUASIGROUPS
Quasigroups used in cryptography consist of an n×n matrix
consisting of permutations of elements of a finite field Zn
such that no element repeats in any row or column and all
elements appear in every row and column. Here n is called
the order of the quasigroup. Commonly chosen value of n is
256 such that it allows for us to work with the input stream
at byte level. Quasigroups support an operation, denoted by ·,
for any two elements in the matrix such that a corresponding
inverse operation, denoted by \, exists. For example, for any
two elements x and y, the following holds true: x ·y = x ·z ⇒
y = z and y · x = z · x ⇒ y = z. Further, x · y = z implies
y = x \ z.
The · and \ operations are table lookup operations as
illustrated by the following example of the working of a
conventional quasigroup cipher implementation.
Example 1: Table 1 presents a quasigroup of order 6. The
left most column and the top most row are index numbers. An
· 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 3 2 6 4 5
2 2 6 4 5 1 3
3 3 2 6 4 5 1
4 4 5 1 3 2 6
5 5 1 3 2 6 4
6 6 4 5 1 3 2
TABLE I
A QUASIGROUP OF ORDER 6.
· 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 3 2 5 6 4
2 5 1 6 3 4 2
3 6 2 1 4 5 3
4 3 5 4 1 2 6
5 2 4 3 6 1 5
6 4 6 5 2 3 1
TABLE II
INVERSE FOR THE QUASIGROUP IN TABLE I.
initial seed element is chosen, say s = 3, and let the input data
stream be represented by {m1,m2,m3,m4,m5,m6,m7,m8}
= {1, 5, 4, 2, 6, 4, 5, 3}. Then the encryption process produces
an encrypted output stream {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8} as
follows,
Quasigroup Encryption
1. Let qGroup[][] represent the quasigroup matrix
2. To encrypt mis do,
Set c1 = qGroup[s][m1]
For i > 1, repeat until all mis are encrypted
ci = qGroup[ci−1][mi]
Execution of the encryption operation for the given input
stream is shown below:
c1 = s ·m1 = 3 · 1 = 3
c2 = c1 ·m2 = 3 · 5 = 5
c3 = c2 ·m3 = 5 · 4 = 2
c4 = c3 ·m4 = 2 · 2 = 6
c5 = c4 ·m5 = 6 · 6 = 2
c6 = c5 ·m6 = 2 · 4 = 5
c7 = c6 ·m7 = 5 · 5 = 6
c8 = c7 ·m8 = 6 · 3 = 5
The above encryption operation is a table look up operation
over table 1.
For the decryption operation, inverse quasigroup matrix is
constructed (table II). To construct the invQGroup[][] matrix,
do the following: in the jth column of the ith row in
invQGroup[][] matrix write the column number of element
j from the ith row in qGroup[][].
To decrypt do the following,
1) m1 = invQGroup[s][c1]
2) For i > 1, do until all cis are decrypted
• mi = invQGroup[ci−1][ci]
In general, the direct application of the above encryption al-
gorithm is very effective in randomizing the input data stream.
However, given an input data stream and its corresponding
output data stream a known plain text attack can be launched
because qGroup[ci−1][mi] = ci. If a long enough mapping
is available it may be possible to fill in a significant number
of elements in the quasigroup matrix, thereby decreasing the
number of possibilities for the group. This is a weakness as
the security of the above encryption depends on keeping the
quasigroup secret.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM 1: QUASIGROUP BLOCK
CIPHER
In order to make quasigroup similar in functionality to the
popular AES system, we use 32 different seeds for each round
of encryption. Multiple rounds of encryption with different
seeds in different rounds finesse the known-plaintext attack
and provide a higher level of security, as in the case of Triple
DES and AES. We choose 32 seeds, because we assume that
each seed is one byte in size and 32 bytes is equal to 256 bits,
which is the commonly used key length for AES systems.
In order to introduce dependencies between bytes of input
data, we divide the data into 128 bit (16 byte) blocks and
encrypt each block separately using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
1) Construct a 256x256 size quasigroup.
2) Generate a random 256 bit encryption key and divide it
into 8 bit (1 byte) blocks which will be used as seed
elements at every round of encryption. This results in
32, 1 byte, seeds.
3) Divide the source data into 128 bit (16 byte) blocks
4) For each block do the following:
a) For each 8-bit block in the cipher key do the
following:
i) Using the current block as a stream of 16, 8-
bit integers, apply the current 8-bit key as the
quasigroup cipher seed and encrypt the block.
ii) Left shift the currently encrypted block by 1,
3, 5 or 7 bits depending on the index of the
current 8-bit key block modulo 4.
Note that although each block is 128 bits long, when
applying quasigroup encryption we further divide the block
into 16, 1 byte sub-block. After every round of encryption,
all the bits (in the sub-blocks) are taken together and then
rotation is applied before the procedure is repeated. A pseudo
code is given below:
Let BlockSize = 16
Let KeySize = 32
Define ShiftDistance as [1,3,5,7]
Define QGMS as Array(256,256)
Define Key as Array(KeySize)
Define Source as Array(N, BlockSize)
Define Output as Array(N, BlockSize)
For Each Block in Source
CipherText = Block
For Each K in Key
CipherText = QuasiGroupCipher(QGMS, K,
CipherText)
CipherText = LeftShift(CipherText,
ShiftDistance[IndexOf(K,Key)
Modulo 4])
Next K
Output[IndexOf(Block,Source)] = CipherText
Next Block
The shift distances of 1, 3, 5, and 7 are each relatively
prime to 2 and thus to 8 (size of a byte). Their sum is 16
(size of 2 bytes) and if each shift is applied 8 times, their sum
becomes 128, which is equal to the block size of 128 bits
(16 bytes) into which the input data was divided. Therefore,
one full rotation of block occurs with shifts of 1, 3, 5 and
7 when all the 32 seeds are used. This ensures that all the
bytes in the encrypted block become interdependent.
A. Test Implementation
A test implementation was written in C#.net, because of
the popular adoption of the pre-existing AES cipher suite
inbuilt in C#. Additionally, Microsoft Visual Studio 2010
has built in unit-testing facilities, which combined with Test-
Driven-Development, produced well-tested code in reduced
increments of time. The test implementation has the ability to
overwrite the plaintext buffer, in place, limiting the memory
footprint required to encode a buffer. The quasigroup matrix is
generated using the Knuth/Fisher-Yates Shuffle [5]. Keys were
generated using random-number generator, System.Random,
allocating 16 random bytes per request. Both the encryption
and decryption routines were constructed and tested.
B. Analysis
We used the National Institute of Technology - Statis-
tical Test Suite (NIST-STS) suite to evaluate the random-
ness introduced by the system in the cipher. The NIST-
STS package gives a P-value for various standardized tests.
The P-value is the probability that a perfect random number
generator would have produced a less random sequence than
the one being tested [15]. Control tests were performed
against the plain text source. The NIST-STS test suite is
available freely in C source code, and downloadable from
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/index.html. The tool
can be configured to read a source file as a stream of bits, and
evaluate the randomness of that stream. We report the results
for the following tests - approximate entropy, block frequency,
cumulative sums forward (CS-F) & cumulative sums reverse
(CS-R), fast fourier transform, frequency, longest run, runs,
rank and serial 1 and serial 2; where the parameters used for
the tests are given in table III-B.
Each test, upon successful completion, produced a P-value
result which is to be interpreted as above. If a P-value for a test
is determined to be equal to 1, then the sequence appears to
have perfect randomness. A P-value of zero indicates that the
Block Frequency Test - block length(m) 128
Non-overlapping Template Test - block length(m) 9
Overlapping Template Test - block length(m) 9
Approximate Entropy Test - block length(m) 10
Serial Test - block length(m) 16
Linear Complexity Test - block length(m) 500
TABLE III
PARAMETERS FOR THE NIST-STS TEST
sequence appears to be completely non-random [15]. However,
both P-values of 1 and 0 are failure conditions in the tests.
Table IV shows the P-values for the various tests. In the
table the first three columns show the average P-values for
all zero (0x00) input, all 0xFF input and a text taken from
Aesop fables (“From the Goose and the Golden Eggs”). The
first column lists the various tests done, second column is
the average P-values for encryption of all three inputs using
quasigroups, third column is the average P-value for all three
inputs using AES and the third column is the ratio of the
P-value of encryption using quasigroups to that using AES
multiplied by 100. The last four columns are P-values for all
zero (0x00) and 0xFF inputs.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM 2: QUASIGROUP BLOCK
ENCRYPTION WITH CIPHER BLOCK CHAINING
To improve the performance of quasigroup block ciphers
in the Approximate Entropy, Serial 1 and Serial 2 tests, we
extended algorithm 1 to include cipher block chaining (CBC).
Mathematically, CBC is written as:
C0 := e(k,M0 ⊕ iv)
Cn+1 := e(k,Mn+1 ⊕ Cn)
Where, Cn: an indexed cipher text block, Mn: an indexed
plain text block, k: the cipher key (here seed), iv: A random
initialization vector, where |iv| = |Cn| = |Mn|, e(k,m): the
encryption function, QGBC in this case.
A. Test Implementation
After implementing quasigroup block cipher with cipher
block chaining, tests were repeated 20 times using a 256
bit random key (32, 1 byte seeds) each time. The resulting
encrypted data was tested for randomness using the NIST-STS
test suite, using the same parameters as before.
Table V compares a average P-value results from the
NIST-STS test suite. The quasigroup block cipher with CBC
outperformed AES256 with CBC in almost all cases.
It is to be noted that the variance of P-values between
different test results may be misleading, as each test has
different acceptance tolerance for P-values.
B. Test on Audio Input
Since sensors may be used to collect audio sig-
nals we perform the encryption operation using quasi-
groups on an audio input file. The source (taken from
Test P-value
for QG
P-value
for AES
P-value QG as
% of P-value of
AES
All 0x00
input AES
All 0x00
input QG
All 0xFF
input AES
All 0xFF
input QG
Block
Frequency
0.57189 0.53593 106.71 0.59109 0.57530 0.48253 0.64041
CS-F 0.47759 0.45340 105.33 0.47739 0.42955 0.36766 0.50679
CS-R 0.47995 0.46111 104.08 0.48052 0.43870 0.36949 0.49906
FFT 0.15798 0.15622 101.12 0.03377 0.043198 0.05215 0.05501
Frequency 0.40314 0.40006 100.77 0.38935 0.34988 0.29779 0.39156
Longest Run 0.30803 0.29188 105.53 0.24881 0.21313 0.17118 0.27998
Runs 0.40384 0.40136 100.62 0.37347 0.37045 0.38143 0.35849
TABLE IV
THE TABLE SHOWS AVERAGE P-VALUES (OVER 20 RUNS) FOR QUASIGROUP ENCRYPTION AS COMPARED TO AES256 ENCRYPTION SYSTEM WHEN THE
SAME ENCRYPTION KEY IS USED FOR BOTH CRYPTOSYSTEMS WITHOUT CIPHER-BLOCK-CHAINING (CBC).
Test P-value
for QG
P-value
for AES-
CBC
P-value QG as
% of P-value of
AES-CBC
All 0x00
input
AES-CBC
All 0x00
input QG
All 0xFF
input
AES-CBC
All 0xFF
input QG
Block
Frequency
0.48822 0.51274 95.22 0.52155 0.47478 0.50250 0.48499
CS-F 0.51939 0.50588 102.67 0.50527 0.49851 0.48968 0.48843
CS-R 0.52502 0.48904 107.36 0.49205 0.51126 0.47860 0.49353
FFT 0.50188 0.48532 103.41 0.46172 0.48304 0.49187 0.49118
Frequency 0.50190 0.47353 105.99 0.48847 0.47584 0.46486 0.48745
Longest Run 0.50468 0.47228 106.86 0.47476 0.46822 0.46320 0.53736
Runs 0.54392 0.51232 106.17 0.53926 0.55004 0.51784 0.54467
Serial 1 0.53571 0.53584 99.98 0.53300 0.51054 0.54146 0.56533
Serial 2 0.51635 0.49246 104.85 0.49903 0.52310 0.47274 0.51659
TABLE V
THE TABLE SHOWS AVERAGE P-VALUES (OVER 20 RUNS) FOR QUASIGROUP ENCRYPTION AS COMPARED TO AES256 ENCRYPTION SYSTEM WHEN THE
SAME ENCRYPTION KEY IS USED FOR BOTH CRYPTOSYSTEMS WITH CIPHER-BLOCK-CHAINING (CBC).
http://www.nch.com.au/acm/11k16bitpcm.wav) and the en-
crypted audio waveforms are plotted in Figures 1 and 2
respectively. As we can see the quasigroup encryption system
is very good at distributing the amplitude of the audio signal
over the entire range.
We further perform a comparison of the randomness of
the signal using the NIST-STS and tabulate the results for
the various tests in Table VI. We see that in most cases
the quasigroup block cipher with CBC randomizes the input
waveform much more than AES256 does, especially in the
case of Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) tests.
Fig. 1. Plot of original input audio waveform
Tests P-value
for AES-
CBC
P-value
for QG-
CBC
P-value of
QG-CBC as
% of P-value
of AES-CBC
Approximate
Entropy
0.00240 0.00221 92.13
Block
Frequency
0.47894 0.46862 97.84
CS-F 0.45362 0.50949 112.32
CS-R 0.45870 0.49385 107.66
FFT 0.44155 0.49124 111.26
Frequency 0.45255 0.50741 112.12
Longest Run 0.47043 0.48993 104.15
Rank 0.48931 0.46916 95.88
Runs 0.48137 0.49307 102.43
Serial 1 0.52025 0.50224 96.54
Serial 2 0.50510 0.50571 100.12
TABLE VI
P-VALUES FOR THE AUDIO ENCRYPTION USING QUASIGROUP ENCRYPTION
AND AES256.
Fig. 2. Plot of encrypted output audio waveform
n T (n)
2 1
3 1
4 4
5 56
6 9048
7 16942080
8 535281401585
9 377597570964258
10 7580721483160132811489280
11 5.36× 1033
12 1.62× 1044
13 2.51× 1056
14 2.33× 1070
15 1.50× 1086
TABLE VII
NUMBER OF REDUCED LATIN SQUARES OF ORDER 2 TO 15.
V. ON THEORETICAL SECURITY OF QUASIGROUP CIPHERS
The total number of Latin squares of order n, n > 2, is
given by LS(n) = n!(n − 1)!T (n), where T (n) denotes the
number of reduced Latin squares of order n. The numbers
T (n) and LS(n) increase very quickly with n [16]. Table VII
gives the number of reduced Latin squares.
From table VIII we see that the number of possibilities for
the Lsatin squares is astronomical. Therefore, if the quasigroup
is kept secret along with the 256 bit key (32 random seeds)
the system provides very good security.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed algorithms for implementa-
tion of quasigroup block cipher. The strength of the algorithms
was assessed by assessing the randomizing property of the
system and the use of statistical test suite by NIST (NIST-
STS). Results of the simulations are tabulated and it is
0.689× 10138 ≥ LS(16) ≥ 0.101× 10119
0.985× 10785 ≥ LS(32) ≥ 0.414× 10726
0.176× 104169 ≥ LS(64) ≥ 0.133× 104008
0.164× 1021091 ≥ LS(128) ≥ 0.337× 1020666
0.753× 10102805 ≥ LS(256) ≥ 0.304× 10101724
TABLE VIII
BOUNDS FOR NUMBER OF LATIN SQUARES FOR ORDERS 16, 32, 64, 128
AND 256.
observed that in almost all the cases the output generated by
the quasigroup encryption system is as or more random than
that produced by AES256 for the same encryption key used.
The results presented were for average P-values over 20 runs
for all zero (0x00) input, all 0xFF input, and an Aesop fable.
We also performed tests on audio input and results have been
presented.
In future work, we intend to perform cryptanalytic attacks
on the proposed quasigroup algorithms. We would also like
to make the quasigroup matrix public with only 32 seeds kept
secret. A research question would be to see what is a good
candidate for a quasigroup (out of numerous possibilities)
when it is public [4]. We also intend to look into FPGA
implementations of the proposed system.
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